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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Torts-Wrongful Death-Effect of Settlement on Allegedly Negligent
Beneficiary's Right to Share in Proceeds
In re Estate of Ives' presented the North Carolina court with a case
involving a situation unparalleled in this or apparently any other jurisdiction. The facts of the case are as follows: the deceased, while riding
as a passenger in an automobile owned and driven by her son, was
killed in a collision with another vehicle. Pursuant to the rights granted
to it in a policy of liability insurance, the son's insurer entered into a
compromise agreement with the administrator of the mother's estate
for all claims which the administrator "had or might have" for the
death of the intestate resulting from this collision. A release was given
in which it was stated "that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment is not to be construed as an
admission of liability on the part of the persons . . .hereby released by

whom liability is expressly denied. ' '2 Subsequently the administrator
brought a proper 3 proceeding to determine if the son should be entitled
to share in the distribution of the wrongful death assets. 4 Affirming the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that in spite of the
fact that there were no findings of fact that the son was at fault or that
he knew of the compromise agreement, and notwithstanding the express
denial of liability in the release, the son could not share in the proceeds
paid by the insurer in settlement of this claim. The basis of the decision
was centered around the equitable maxim that "no one will be permitted to enrich himself by his own wrong."
As a general rule this maxim is usually applied in three categories of
cases wherein there appears the question of the negligent beneficiary's
receiving amounts otherwise due him. In the first of these categories,
where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance has caused the death
of the cestui que vie, the majority view is that a merely negligent beneficiary will not be precluded from taking the share due him. 5 To be
precluded from sharing it must be shown not merely that the beneficiary
caused the death of the cestui que vie, but that the death was a result
of a willful or felonious act on the part of the named beneficiary. Like1248
N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958).
2
1d. at 179, 102 S.E.2d at 809.
3

In re Stone, 173 N.C. 208, 91 S.E. 852 (1917).

'The court held that all amounts received under a compromise agreement in a
wrongful death action are distributed as wrongful death assets. Ibid.
Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Minasian
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936) ; PATTERSON, ESSENTAIs
oF INsuRANcE LAW § 35 (2d ed. 1957); RICEARDs, INsJRANcE § 129 (5th ed.
1952).
'Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910); Bullock
v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951); Neff v.
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wise in the second category, cases of intestate succession, the beneficiary or distributee must, as a general rule, be guilty of something
7
more than negligence to be precluded from taking the share due him.
Those jurisdictions that do allow an "ancestor murderer" to inherit
justify such by a strict interpretation of the statute of descent and distribution when there is no statute in point otherwise.8
In the third category, actions for wrongful death, it is the North
Carolina view and the majority view that the negligent beneficiary will
not be allowed to share in the distribution of any wrongful death proceeds. 9 At least one case has allowed the negligent beneficiary to recover,10 but it is to be noted that in this jurisdiction wrongful death
assets are treated as assets of the decedent's estate," and the theory of
action in that case was that the administrator sought to recover in the
right of the deceased, not for the beneficiary. An examination of the
various state statutes conferring a right of action for death by wrongful
act reveals that the majority of jurisdictions treat wrongful death
recoveries as compensation for the decedent's next of kin, and not as
general assets of the decedent's estate.
In a jurisdiction such as North Carolina, where the wrongful death
assets are treated as compensation, 12 it is relatively easy to understand
why the negligent beneficiary-distributee will be precluded from taking
a distributive share, and yet not precluded from taking as a beneficiary
in a life insurance policy or in cases of intestate succession. The apparent inconsistency is explained when it is realized that in cases of
life insurance and intestate succession the negligent beneficiary is only
receiving that which he would have received had the deceased died a
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952); PATERSON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 35.
"In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (1914) ; McMichael v. Proctor, 243
N.C. 479, 91 S.E.2d 231 (1956) (where widow, acquitted of second degree murder,
nevertheless admitted she fired the pistol that killed intestate husband, was allowed
to receive her dower); Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 576 (1955);
Ward
v. Ward, 174 Va. 331, 6 S.E.2d 664 (1940).
8
Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Corin. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953). See also Notes, 26 N.C.L.
RF~v. 232 (1948), 33 N.C.L. REv. 702 (1955).
'Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947) ; Arnold v. Jacobs,
319 Mass. 130, 65 N.E.2d 4 (1946). See also Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948). A
minority of jurisdictions hold that the negligence of one of the beneficiaries is a bar
to the action in toto, on the doctrine that the negligence of one is imputed to the
others; see, e.g. Peterson v. Cochran & McCluer Co., 308 Ill. App. 438, 31 N.E.2d
825 (1941).
10 Wymore v. Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396, 43 N.W. 264 (1889).
'" IowA CoDE ANN. fr 635.9 (1950).
1 "The amount recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as assets, in
the payment of debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the deceased .... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1957). "The plaintiff in such action may recover
such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting
from such death." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1950), Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235
N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
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normal death, while in cases involving the recompense of a wrongful
death the proceeds in question are those which the (potential) beneficiary would not have received had the deceased died a normal death
at the time in question.
However, the instant case is unique in that it applies this principle of
non-profiting by wrongdoing where there has been no judicial finding of
negligence, but rather where there has been an express denial of liability
agreed upon by the parties. Thus the established rule of law invoked
has been extended in its applicability to a situation where there has been
a wrongful death recovery from a source of funds paid in settlement on
behalf of the allegedly negligent beneficiary to release that beneficiary
from a claim of negligence. This extension of the old maxim appears
to be well grounded in reason when one considers the presumptions of
negligence arising from the case and the source of the funds from which
the beneficiary seeks to partake.
One presumption of negligence seems to arise out of the amount of
the settlement in relation to the face value of the insurance policy.
Here the insurance company paid the administrator seventy percent
of the maximum liability it could incur on the policy. From this fact
it appears logical to assume that the insurer most certainly thought that
its insured was at fault. As a general rule evidence of a compromise
agreement is not admissible into evidence as an admission of liability and
proves only that peace was brought.13 However, the instant case does not
conflict with the general rule as it did not present a question of the admissibility of evidence, but rather a question of the inferences to be
drawn from facts already before the court. It would seem that a second
presumption of negligence arises from the fact that during the two
years that elapsed between the collision and the hearing in the supreme
court, the son had made no claim against the driver of the other vehicle
14
for damages which it is reasonable to assume that his car incurred.
Considering the source of the funds as a bar to recovery, no cases
could be found where the holder of a policy of automobile liability
insurance collected anything under that policy where he was the driver
of the automobile. 15 Furthermore, there is the fact that in North Carolina, as the administrator in a wrongful death proceeding acts for the
"' Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 83 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1949) ; Penn
Dixie Lines Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410 (1953).
14248 N.C. at 183, 102 S.E.2d at 812. However, the court apparently overlooks
the fact, or fails to make mention of it, that the driver of the other vehicle had likewise brought no claim against the son alleging fault by the son.
"1But a holder of a liability policy has recovered under that policy where he was
a passenger in an accident involving his automobile where coverage of the policy
extended to those injured by an authorized driver of the insured. Aetna Cas. and
Surety Co. v. General Cas. and Surety Co., 285 App. Div. 767, 140 N.Y.S.2d 670

(1955).
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benefit of the beneficiaries and not the estate of the deceased, the administrator becomes the representative of the beneficiaries in this type of
action."" This means that if the son could be a beneficiary the administrator had to represent the son's claim, and in the principal case the
administrator's claim for negligence was actually against the son himself. This begs the ridiculous question of how could the administrator
have represented the son's claim against himself for his own alleged
wrong.
WALToN

K.

JOYNER

'0 Pearson v. National Manufacture & Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S.E.2d
811 (1941). "[T]he right of action created by statute for wrongful death does not
constitute an asset of the estate, but belongs to the beneficiaries designated by the
statute as beneficiary of the recovery, as is the law in this state, [and] the administrator in bringing the action is pro hac vice their representative and not the
representative of the estate."

